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Issue2

COURT REPORTS

NEW YORK
Higgins v. Vill. of Orchard Park, 716 N.Y.S.2d 845 (N.Y. App. Div.
2000) (holding the trial court improperly denied property owners'
injunction and summary judgment motion because the property
owners had established nuisance as a matter of law).
In April 1995, Village of Orchard Park ("Orchard") entered an
agreement with Richard and Ruth Higgins to alleviate flooding caused
by Orchard's discharge of water onto the Higgins' property. The
agreement decreed that Orchard would install a drainage channel
through the Higgins' land, which connected to a natural drainage
ditch located on adjoining property. However, the adjoining property
owner objected, resulting in Orchard stopping the channel on the
Higgins' land and, instead, installing a drainage gate.
The Higgins brought suit in June 1998, alleging, among other
things, negligence, breach of contract, continuing trespass, and
nuisance. The Higgins also sought an injunction to enjoin Orchard
from continuing to discharge surface water onto their property. The
trial court denied both the injunction and Higgins' summary
judgment motion concerning the nuisance action. Additionally, the
trial court denied the Higgins' motion to add causes of action for
inverse condemnation or de facto taking, abuse of process, prima facie
tort, and violations of the Higgins' Equal Protection rights. Orchard
moved to dismiss the negligence and breach of contract actions as
time barred, and to dismiss the continuing trespass and nuisance
action because the Higgins' alleged failure to state in their complaint
that they had complied with relevant law. The trial court denied the
dismissal motions.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division
reversed the trial court's denial of Orchard's dismissal motions with
regard to the negligence and breach of contract actions, finding such
actions were time barred. The appellate court also found the Higgins
had established, as a matter of law, that Orchard unreasonably created
a drainage channel that moved water from one portion of the Higgins'
property to another. Furthermore, the appellate court concluded that
once Orchard installed the drainage channel, it knew flooding had
resulted. Thus, the appellate court held the trial court erred both in
denying the Higgins' summary judgment motion on the private
Moreover, the
nuisance claim and in denying the injunction.
appellate court found the trial court erred in denying the Higgins'
motion seeking leave to amend the complaint to add a cause of action
for inverse condemnation or a de facto taking. However, because the
other causes of action the Higgins wished to add either lacked merit or
were insufficiently pled, the appellate court declared the trial court
properly denied those causes of action.
Finally, the Higgins alleged Orchard's building inspector's
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building permit denial was arbitrary and capricious. The appellate
court found that Higgins' proper remedy was to challenge the
building inspector's action through a CPLR article 78 proceeding, and,
thus, converted the action to the proper proceeding.
Makayla A. Shannon
LaSala v. Terstiege, 713 N.Y.S.2d 767 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (holding
the Town of Babylon failed to meet the burden of proof to establish
good title to land situated under the water of Great Neck Creek).
The Town of Babylon ("Town") appealed an order from the
Supreme Court of New York, Suffolk County granting Anthony
LaSala's motion for summary judgment. The Town also appealed the
same court's order dismissing the Town's counterclaim regarding title
to land situated under the water of the Great Neck Creek ("Land").
LaSala originally brought the action to quiet title to the Land. In
order for the Town to prevail, it was required to show possession and
good title, and, according to Real Property and Proceedings Law
("RPAPL") article 15, could not rely on the weakness of the LaSala's
title, to prevail. The Town asserted it possessed superior title to the
Land based on grants issued by Colonial governors in 1666, 1688, and
1694. The Town also asserted no conveyance to an individual existed.
The earlier conveyances granted the Town title to all land lying under
tidewaters. Therefore, the Town needed to prove Great Neck Creek
was defined as tidewater.
LaSala provided the court with an unbroken chain of title dating
back to 1831. Each conveyance granted title to land "bounded on the
east by Great Neck Creek" or "with title running to the center of Great
Neck Creek."
The court stated the Town failed to show Great Neck Creek was
considered tidewater. Therefore, the Town failed to meet its burden
of proof. The court further asserted LaSala's title fell within the scope
of an earlier holding. The previous court found, in the absence of
express language in the conveyance, the title to a non-tidal stream is
presumed to extend to the center of that stream.
The court, in reviewing all documents and evidence, determined
the supreme court properly granted LaSala's motion for summary
judgment, and validated LaSala's title to the Land.
Lynne Stadjuhar
Water Auth. of W. Nassau County v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 714
N.Y.S.2d 726 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (holding the statute of limitations
barred the civil action instituted by the Water Authority of Western
Nassau County for damages to real property caused by ground water
contamination).

